



TPP may benefit both global businesses and the developing
countries where they operate
At times, negotiations have been close to failing in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the free trade area (FTA)
being negotiated by 12 countries in the Americas, Asia, and the Pacific. These difficulties can be explained by two
main factors. First, countries involved (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand,
Peru, Singapore, the US and Vietnam) are geographically dispersed and economically quite heterogeneous in
terms of development, size, and type of regime. These geographical, economic and political differences have
often been an obstacle to reaching a deal. In particular, the road to cooperation between democratic and
authoritarian regimes and between free-market and state-led economies has been often paved with mutual
distrust. The hard-nosed negotiations faced by China, Russia, and Vietnam to enter into the World Trade
Organization (WTO) demonstrate this stumbling block.
Average tariffs are low, but they are still substantive in some industries.
Second, the TPP is not only about cutting tariffs, but is also about reducing behind-the-door barriers. In fact, many
would go as far as to say that the TPP is mostly about reducing regulatory non-tariff barriers. While the TPP aims
to be particularly ambitious on these issues, this is hardly a new phenomenon. According to the DESTA database,
the number of trade agreements including detailed provisions regulating investment, government procurement,
and services, protecting intellectual property rights, and enhancing competition policies has been steadily
increasing over time. Not surprisingly, this trend is particularly pronounced for trade agreements between North
and South countries. In sum, in the era of a major WTO round deadlock, agreements like the TPP have the
ambition of being instruments of trade governance rather than mere tariff deals.
Given that countries negotiating the TPP are all members of
both the WTO and trade agreements, it is fair to ask is what
would actually be the economic benefits of concluding this
deal. According to Paul Krugman, the TPP is no big deal. In
fact, Krugman advised President Barack Obama not to spend
political capital on this pact. His argument is that tariffs are
already quite low and so the benefits would be trivial. While
sound, the argument is somewhat simplistic. First, average
tariffs are low, but they are still quite substantive in some
industries. For instance, Japanese tariffs on beef are roughly
40 percent. Second, economic benefits from removing non-tariffs barriers would be quite sizable, especially in
countries like Australia and Mexico. Third, economic studies, such as this one by Trefler, have already shown that
even relatively small tariff cuts produce significant increases in productivity in the long run.
If the benefits are not trivial, who is going to reap them? According to Krugman, the real beneficiaries of the TPP
are going to be Big Pharma, which will see a further increase in their profit. Similarly, Joseph Stiglitz believes that
the TPP would increase the power of multinational corporations, jeopardizing American jobs and worsening
inequality. The argument that benefits are likely to be concentrated is confirmed by a recent working paper on US
trade agreements and foreign investment. According to our recent study, trade agreements produce a substantial
reallocation of sales from the least productive to the most productive US affiliates in host markets. In other words,
even among a very selective sample of US multinational corporations (MNCs) involved in global production, only
a handful reap significant benefits from preferential liberalization, whereas many lose.
Corporations have incentives to lobby for tariff reduction in their own home markets, where goods
are ultimately shipped back.
In which way would the TPP help US MNCs? While regulations and non-tariff barriers matter, old-fashion tariffs
remain pivotal. Specifically, offshoring activities, i.e. affiliate sales back to the home market, respond to tariff cuts
implemented by the US. This is because cutting tariffs cuts production costs for MNCs. By benefiting large
corporations involved in global production networks, even the TPP is likely to create an unexpected collusion
between MNCs based in North countries and governments of South countries. Indeed, MNCs have incentives to
lobby for tariff reduction in their own home markets, where goods are ultimately shipped back, rather than in host
markets. Given this unusual alliance between North MNCs and South countries, it comes as no surprise that,
according to a recent survey by the Pew Research Center, the Vietnamese are the most TPP-enthusiastic.
A final note should be made with regard to China. An alternative way of looking at the TPP is that the deal is all
about China. Specifically, the US aims to lock in its own regulations and standards before China becomes an even
more relevant actor eager to do the same, especially in its own backyard. A recent working paper by Robert
Gulotty and Li Xiaojun (“Domestic Responses to Global Production Diversion: Evidence from Chinese
Manufacturing Firms” 2015) shows that the cost of being excluded from the TPP can be significant for Chinese
firms involved in global production activities. Indeed, Chinese firms, especially state-owned enterprises, are likely
to face investment discrimination in terms of higher non-tariff barriers in those markets negotiating the TPP. To
conclude, although it has been a long drawn-out process, all signs point to the TPP eventually being signed.
When that happens, the TPP will be a landmark agreement on par with NAFTA.
Featured Image: Google Map of the Pacific Ocean.  Container Photo Credit: Daniel Ramirez CC-BY-2.0
Leonardo Baccini is an assistant professor of International Relations in the
department of Political Science at McGill University. His research focuses on
international political economy and comparative political economy with an emphasis
on international trade. His first book, Cutting the Gordian Knot of Economic Reform,
was published by Oxford University Press. Professor Baccini’s research has been
widely published in leading social science journals, such as British Journal of Political
Science, The Journal of Politics, and World Politics.
Copyright © 2015 London School of Economics
